It seems appropriate to begin this year’s paper with the following judicial observation:
“The process for judicial review of the decisions of administrative tribunals is among the most difficult of common law creations to rationalize and apply. The criteria for judicial review are a fruitful source of angst and confusion for law students, lawyers and judges. We have created this mess in an attempt to limit the authority of quasi judicial bodies while upholding the legislative delineation of tribunal powers and giving context to the legislated protection of tribunal decisions.
To fully appreciate just how uncertain and some might say silly the test for determining whether a judge should interfere with an administrative tribunal’s decision has become, one need only know that every application for judicial review requires each of the litigants to provide the reviewing judge with an analysis of the law of pragmatism first promulgated in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. That exercise alone, is responsible for the serious depletion of forests.”
Given the tremendous volume of administrative law cases, I am reluctant to make any promises about conserving our forests!
While the past year again has not seen any earth-shaking conceptual developments, there have been a number of interesting decisions about standards of review; the relationship between judicial review in the Federal Court and proceedings against the federal Crown in provincial superior courts; standing; and procedural fairness.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
III. NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
IV. STANDING
V. MULTIPLE FORUMS: THE TELEZONE GROUP OF CASES
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
VII. A MISCELLANY OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK
IX. CONCLUSION